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Introduction 
This paper explores an important recent development in the process of international 
climate change governance. That development is the formation of a number of selective 
state-based forums for dialogue and/or decision-making on climate change outside the 
established institutional structure of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). A number of these selective state-based climate forums 
were instigated by the USA and Australia, the two developed countries under Annex 1 
of the UNFCCC that, for the most part of the last decade, remained opposed to the 
binding emission reduction targets and differentiated emission reduction obligations of 
the Kyoto Protocol.1 The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
(APP), the APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration of 2007 (APEC Sydney Declaration) and 
the US Major Economies Process (MEP) of 2007–2008 were all instigated and/or 
heavily supported by the US and Australia. A common thread to these three selective 
state-based climate change forums is a willingness to allow important decision making 
on climate change to be devolved to a small group of key state actors, with little or no 
formal input from environmental or research non-governmental organisations. This 
paper seeks to analyse this recent development in international climate governance in  
 
                                                 
1 Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol upon the Rudd Labor Government coming to power in November 
2007. 
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terms of its compatibility with the democratic governance principles of cosmopolitan 
and deliberative democratic theory.  
 
The first section outlines the interdisciplinary research design of the paper that draws on 
the disciplines of international law (IL) and critical constructivist international relations 
(IR) theory. This section also outlines the concept of ‘discourse’ that is later relied on to 
analyse the emergence of these selective state-based forums and the contestation they 
offer to existing intersubjective meaning on the process for international governance of 
climate change. The second section outlines the two key theoretical traditions of 
democratic theory, cosmopolitan and deliberative, that are later used in analysis of these 
selective state-based climate forums. The third section of the paper builds on this by 
introducing the concept of ‘minilateralism’ that has been developed by a number of 
academics and policy commentators to support a shift towards more exclusive modes of 
governance of international problems. The fourth section briefly outlines the process of 
the UN climate regime and the three selective state-based climate change governance 
forums that have arisen and been promoted by the USA and Australia in the second half 
of the last decade. The final section of the paper argues these selective state-based 
climate change forums embody a discourse of ‘exclusive minilateralism’ that is 
contesting the inclusive multilateral discourse on the process of international climate 
governance. The paper concludes with observations on the challenges that the exclusive 
minilateralism discourse poses for cosmopolitan and discursive democracy in 
international climate governance, and suggestions on how these challenges might be 
managed.  
 
Research design 
Critical Constructivist International Relations Theory  
Constructivism is an interpretive IR theory that focuses upon the ‘role of ideas, norms, 
knowledge, culture, and arguments in politics, stressing in particular the role of 
collectively held intersubjective ideas and understanding on social life’ (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 2001: 392). Unlike the three more established IR theories of realism, 
institutionalism and liberalism, constructivists: 
 
reject the notion that states or other actors have objectively determined interests that they can 
pursue by selecting strategies and designing effective institutions. Rather, international actors 
operate within a social context of shared subjective understandings and norms, which constitute 
their identities and roles and define appropriate forms of conduct … Most specific norms and 
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understandings are generated, disseminated, and internalised through the efforts and discourse of 
diverse actors … In the constructivist view, even as states and other actors create norms and 
institutions to further their interests and values, those norms and institutions are redefining those 
interests and values, perhaps even the identities of the actors themselves. (Abbott 2004: 367). 
 
The constructivist emphasis on ideas, which are often referred to as ‘norms’ in this 
literature, is an obvious common starting point for interdisciplinary research designs 
incorporating IL and constructivist IR theory (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97). 
The constructivist IR tradition is divided into two broad strands. Firstly, conventional 
constructivism, seeks to trace the causal impact of identities and norms on state 
behaviour (100).2 The conventional constructivist approach is concerned with 
identifying the causative effect of particular ideas or norms on state behaviour during a 
specific event or series of events in the international system (100). Conventional 
constructivist work adopts a research design more closely aligned with the positivist 
social science paradigm in formulating hypotheses regarding the causal influence of 
norms on past state behaviour and subjecting them to empirical testing and investigation 
(Pettenger 2007: 9–10). However, the second strand of constructivist work, critical 
constructivism, is less wedded to the positivist paradigm. Critical constructivism is more 
concerned with ‘uncovering the power relations that underpin and are reproduced by 
social relations, including knowledge-creating and knowledge-laden relations’ that 
privilege some actors over others (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2007: 97). Finnemore 
and Sikkink describe critical constructivism as having: 
 
intellectual roots in critical social theory, including such figures as Anthony Giddens, Jurgen 
Habermas, and Michel Foucault. Although it shares the core features of constructivism identified 
above, critical constructivism adds a belief that constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify 
relations of power. Critical constructivists believe that certain powerful groups play a privileged 
role in the process of social construction. The task of the critical scholar is both to unmask these 
ideational structures of domination and to facilitate the imagining of alternative worlds. Critical 
constructivists thus see a weaker autonomous role for ideas than do other constructivists because 
ideas are viewed as more tightly linked to relations of material power. (2001: 398) 
 
Critical constructivist IR theory is thus concerned with how ideas are used as an 
expression of power to shape the intersubjective meaning of international phenomena 
and the interests of the actors concerned. Critical constructivist IR theory usefully 
complements IL research in providing a theoretical framework for analysis of the 
political context in which international law and international legal institutions are 
formed. Unlike conventional constructivism, the critical IR approach does not seek to 
test the effect of international law as a causal mechanism on particular instances of state 
                                                 
2 For a prominent example of conventional constructivist work, see Wendt (1999). 
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behaviour.3 Rather, critical constructivism provides understanding of the power-laden 
web of intersubjective meaning embodied in international law and legal institutions. 
Critical constructivist IR theory also offers a theoretical framework for analysing how 
such intersubjective meaning is contested and altered over time. The ‘critical’ (i.e. 
emancipatory) potential of constructivism is in providing understanding of the power-
laden web of intersubjective meaning that constitutes, and is constituted by, 
international law and legal institutions. This understanding opens up the possibility of 
international collective self-reflection for change. As Neufeld explains: 
 
it is clear how interpretative approaches offer support for notions of progressive and emancipatory 
change in the global order. The intersubjective meanings which constitute the global order are 
themselves the product of an ongoing process of self-definition and self reflection, they are, then 
like all practices which instantiate them, open to change. (1993: 58) 
 
Current international law, institutions and practices might therefore be viewed not as a 
natural ‘given’ reality, impervious to substantial change, but rather one of many 
possible socially constructed orders of intersubjective meaning available to the 
international community (Neufeld 1993: 59). A critical constructivist understanding of 
international affairs thus opens the possibility for understanding discursive contestation 
over current international law, legal institutions and practices (Dryzek 2006). 
 
Interdisciplinarity: Critical Constructivist IR Theory and International Law 
Despite the areas of common ground between the theoretical frameworks of critical 
constructivist IR theory and international legal analysis there have been only limited 
attempts to specifically link the two in research design. One of the more substantial 
explorations of the use of critical constructivist IR theory in analysis of international 
institutions is contained in the work of John Dryzek (2005; 2007: 44–62).4 Dryzek 
invites international lawyers to look beneath the text of an international agreement to 
the underlying ideas and intersubjective meanings upon which the agreement is 
structured.5 Dryzek refers to this set of underlying ideas and intersubjective beliefs as a 
‘discourse,’ which he defines as ‘a shared set of concepts, categories, and ideas that 
provides its adherents with a framework for making sense of situations, embodying 
judgements, assumptions, capabilities, dispositions and intentions’ (2006: 1).  
                                                 
3 Even more adventurous sociological analysis within international legal scholarship has not been able to 
prove international law as a decisive causal mechanism in the behaviour of states, see Chayes (1974). 
4 See Dryzek (2006: 23) for discussion of the critical constructivist research design of his work. 
5 Dryzek (2007: 60) uses the IT metaphor that discourses ‘can provide the “software” that makes 
international regimes work, while more formal organizations and rules provide the “hardware.’” 
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Dryzek provides a typology of the more prominent discourses operating in 
environmental governance and international politics more generally over recent decades 
(2005; 2006; 2007; 2009).6 He suggests that discourses are social structures that both 
enable and constrain actions (Dryzek 2006: 24–25).7 Discourse is constraining in the 
sense that it is constitutive of the subject dispositions and capacities of actors and is 
produced and reproduced by subsequent actions and interactions (Dryzek 2007: 62). 
Discourse is also enabling in the sense that actors draw on existing discourses to ‘subtly 
affect the content and weight of discourses’ within a given social structure (Dryzek 
2006: 24–25). Dryzek thus comments: 
 
Discourses can embody power in that they condition norms and perceptions of actors, suppressing 
some interests whilst advancing others. Discourses pervade, constitute, and help explain the 
structure of international affairs. The power of discourses arises in their ability to structure and 
coordinate the actions of individuals’ subject wholly or partly to them. (2006: 3) 
 
Dryzek argues that some discourses are ‘hegemonic’ in the sense that they are so 
ingrained in social structures that they are ‘not even recognised by those subject to them, 
but are instead treated as the natural order of things’ (2006: 8). However, discourses are 
not static. Over time, coalitions of actors (that is, discourse coalitions) emerge with 
alternate discourses that seek to contest even hegemonic discourses (Dryzek 2006). This 
contestation leads to change through either a dialectical accommodation/merging of 
competing discourses or the defeat of a competing discourse. Although Dryzek argues 
that discourses are important in understanding international affairs, he importantly 
points out that they cannot alone explain international social life and collective 
outcomes. Dryzek concedes that other factors such as material factors and non-linguistic 
practices are also important (2007: 62). This article adopts Dryzek’s concept of 
discourse in analysing contestation over the process of international climate governance 
that flows from the emergence of the selective state-based climate governance forums 
introduced above. 
 
Leading models of democracy 
Democracy is itself a highly contested concept (Dryzek 2010: 21). However, as Dryzek 
(2000: 7–12) explains, there are two leading theoretical models of democracy at a 
                                                 
6 Dryzek (2009: 187) identifies a number of discourses operating in the field including; ecological limits, 
climate science scepticism, energy security and ecological modernisation. This article argues that a 
further discourse of ‘exclusive minilateralism’ must also be recognised. 
7 Dryzek’s approach builds on Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory, most fully described in his 1984 
work, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
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domestic level. Liberal democracy ‘deals only in the reconciliation and aggregation of 
preferences defined prior to political interaction’ (Dryzek 2000: 10). Liberal democratic 
theory views democracy as a social choice mechanism which reconciles conflict by 
aggregating individual actor preferences that are pre-formed and unaffected by political 
interaction. Liberal democratic activity is pursued by actors who strategically further 
their pre-formed interests by voting in elections to determine the make-up of 
constitutionally entrenched institutions of the domestic state. Liberal democratic theory 
is thus directed towards the effectiveness of the aggregative and reconciliatory functions 
of the constitutionally entrenched institutions of the domestic liberal state.  
 
The second leading model of democracy at a domestic level is deliberative democracy. 
In deliberative democracy, institutions ought to be designed primarily to facilitate 
deliberation by political actors (Dryzek 2000: 1). As Dryzek explains, deliberation is ‘a 
social process distinguished from other kinds of communication in that deliberators are 
amenable to changing their judgements, preferences, and views during the course of 
their interactions, which involve persuasion, manipulation and deception’ (2000: 1). 
Deliberative democracy is thus concerned with the ‘authenticity of democracy: the 
degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged in 
by competent citizens’ (2000: 1). Domestic institutions designed to promote deliberative 
democracy are concerned with improving the circumstances of communication and 
hence the capacity of actors to reflect upon and change their preferences (and ultimately 
voting patterns and other forms of political participation) in response to the better 
argument. 
 
At an international level, there is no institutional equivalent to the sovereign of the 
domestic liberal democratic state that has the power to make, enforce and administer 
laws that may override the consent of an individual citizen. The various institutions of 
the United Nations system (that is, the Security Council, General Assembly, and 
International Court of Justice) come the closest to replication of the functions of the 
domestic sovereign, however, ultimately derive their authority from the ongoing consent 
of the states involved. Despite the lack of an equivalent to the domestic sovereign, 
liberal and deliberative theories of democracy have been used to analyse the democratic 
credentials of international institutions. The liberal democratic model of democracy has 
been adapted to the international sphere through the concept of cosmopolitan 
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democracy as developed by authors such as Held (1995; 2002; 2006; 2009) and 
Archibugi (1995; 2004).  Cosmopolitan democracy posits not only the furthering of 
government by democratic popular election at a domestic level but also the extension of 
democratic process to governance between states at a regional and global level 
(Archibugi 2004; 442–452). Held (2009: 538) points to the post-1945 proliferation of 
international governmental organisations in the areas of the ‘rules governing war, 
weapons systems, war crimes, human rights and the environment’ as evidence of a re-
conception of the traditional strict sovereignty of the state and indicative of an emergent 
cosmopolitanism in international society. Dryzek describes the cosmopolitan desire to 
extend formal, democratically constituted, rule-based governance structures to the 
international sphere with: 
 
Cosmopolitan democracy favours an international system more densely populated by institutions 
that both secure order and are democratically accountable in direct fashion - that is, not just at 
one remove, through any accountability of states that take part in such arrangement… The 
project looks forward ultimately to an international legal system enforcing democratically 
determined laws, a global parliament to hold all other global institutions to account and 
international control of a military that would in the long run yield demilitarisation. (2006: 151–
152). 
 
However, cosmopolitan democracy also focuses on protection of the rights of the 
individual within the domestic state, with each individual to be accorded equal worth 
and dignity, active agency and personal responsibility (Held 2002: 24). As Held 
explains: 
 
In the first instance, cosmopolitanism can be taken as those basic values that set down standards 
or boundaries that no agent, whether a representative of government, state, or civil association 
should be able to cross. Focussed on the claims of each person as an individual or as a member 
of humanity as a whole, these values espouse the idea that human beings are in a fundamental 
sense equal and deserve equal political treatment (2002: 23) 
  
At its more ambitious edge, the cosmopolitan democratic project proposes direct citizen 
election of representatives to supranational institutions that would have the authority to 
override state sovereignty (Monbiot 2003). The primary focus of all variants of 
cosmopolitan democracy is to extend the aggregative, reconciliatory and accountability 
features of the domestic liberal democratic model into international governance 
structures. The underlying premise of the cosmopolitan project is that individual citizens 
will come to see themselves as world citizens and hence subordinate their more local 
identities and interests to a common global project (Dryzek 2006: 153).  
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However, Dryzek’s discursive democracy is a model for the pursuit of democratic ideals 
in international society that draws more particularly on the deliberative tradition of 
domestic democratic theory. Dryzek argues that in the international sphere, which lacks 
centralised authority and has more dispersed power structures, the deliberative 
democratic project is best pursued through a democratic design that is: 
 
transnational and discursive, highlighting dispersed and competent control over the engagement 
of discourses in transnational public spheres, which in turn constructs or influences international 
outcomes in a variety of ways. Transnational democracy of this sort is not electoral democracy, 
and it is not institutionalised in formal organizations. Instead it is to be sought in 
communicatively competent decentralised control over the content and weight of globally 
consequential discourses, which in turn resonates with theories of deliberative democracy 
stressing communicative action in the public sphere … The public sphere encompasses social 
movements and media communications, and can reach into corporations, states, and 
intergovernmental organisations. It is an informal, communicative realm that can be contrasted 
with the constitutional exercise of authority. (Dryzek 2006: 154) 
 
The weakness of centralised authority in the international system and recourse to 
principles of state sovereignty (that is, sovereign independence) to avoid international 
obligations are no impediments to discursive democracy. The ‘transnational public 
sphere’ of civil society movements and media operations does not require a centralised 
source of authority or state consent in order to engage citizens and other actors in 
reflective, deliberative and communicative processes. As Dryzek explains, activity in 
the international public sphere has a capacity to shape actor perceptions, interests and 
identities and hence the outcome of more formal international institutions (2000: 121–
122). The formal institutions of international society thus embody and reproduce 
discourses. The discourses operating in the transnational public sphere and formal 
international institutions therefore operate in a mutually constitutive manner (121). 
 
Multilateralism and minilateralism in international climate governance 
Multilateralism in international affairs involves ‘creating international bodies, 
agreements, and rules through negotiation on the part of the states that will be subject to 
the arrangements in question, who agree to be bound by the arrangements’ (Dryzek 
2006: 129). The creation of formal rule-based institutions at an international level to 
foster a cooperative approach to international issues lies at the heart of the multilateral 
project. However, this does not mean that multilateral institutions will all have a high 
level of democratic process. The United Nations Security Council is one of the key 
multilateral institutions of the post-war period, yet its five permanent members (that is, 
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the victorious allied powers of WW2) have an individual veto power over any 
substantive decisions of that forum.8 The democratisation of multilateral institutions is 
one of the key elements of the cosmopolitan democratic project an international level, as 
discussed above (Dryzek 2006: 129). The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Kyoto Protocol are the agreements that form the 
central basis of the multilateral institutions of international climate governance. At a 
formal level, the UNFCCC and Kyoto meetings, have a solid claim to cosmopolitan 
democratic principles in that they are inclusive (all states party to those treaties may 
attend relevant meetings and have a single vote in decision making) and have near 
universal participation (most states are party to those treaties). Cosmopolitan theory 
favours at least a majority decision-making rule in intergovernmental institutions 
(Archibugi 2004: 449).9 UNFCCC Draft rule 42 provides that the voting requirements 
for a ‘matter of substance’ are to be decided by the COP.10 However, in the absence of 
agreement by the COP on majority voting (which to date has not occurred) ‘there is a 
broad understanding in the climate change regime that substantive decisions should be 
adopted by consensus’ (Farhana & Depledge 2004).11 This consensus decision-making 
rule of the UNFCCC provides formal equality of state participation in the UNFCCC 
COP meetings so that even the smallest states have a potential veto power over 
substantial decisions.12At least formally, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol decision-
making rules are highly democratic when viewed through a cosmopolitan lens. However, 
the formal equality of states in participation and voting at UNFCCC COP meetings still 
operates in a world of states with significantly differing levels of resources. Practically 
speaking, smaller developing states often have only very limited financial and human 
resources to participate in UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol meetings whilst larger 
developed and developing states often having several hundred representatives present. 
                                                 
8 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, art 27(3). 
9 Although, as Archibugi (2004: 448–449) points out, there is some tension within cosmopolitan thought 
as to whether majority decision making should be based on a majority of states or majority of global 
population. 
10 For Draft Rule 42, see UNFCCC (1996). Draft Rule 42 contains two draft voting rules for the COP to 
make decisions on ‘matters of substance.’ The first rule allows for a retreat from a consensus voting rule 
to a two-thirds or three-quarters majority voting rule once attempts to reach consensus are exhausted. The 
second requires a consensus vote except on financial matters. 
11 Consensus is generally taken to be present if no party raises a formal objection to a particular decision; 
see Farhana & Depledge (2004: 443–444). 
12 The consensus decision-making rule within the UNFCCC appeared to be strained at the 2010 COP 16 
meeting in Cancun, Mexico. Towards the end of the COP meeting, the COP President chairing the 
meeting, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Ms Espinosa, overruled the express formal objection of Bolivia, 
in order for the COP to formally adopt a package of decisions on mitigation, climate finance, adaptation 
and technology (Vihma 2011). 
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As Timmons-Roberts and Parks explain: 
 
Vast differences in absolute and relative income have a tremendous impact upon the ability of 
countries to attend international conferences, participate in international organizations and hire 
skilled negotiators. This is what we call the direct route through which inequality reduces the 
likelihood of cooperation on climate change. It determines whether nations can pay for the 
salaries and accommodations, draft proposals with proper legal argumentation and nomenclature, 
attend the many formal and informal meetings at conferences and respond to the demands of 
powerful nations with well-thought-out counterproposals. (2006: 15–16) 
 
This lack of resources limits small state participation in COP decision making processes 
and effectively forces small states to participate in larger negotiating blocks that may act 
to practically constrain individual state choice and the exercise of their veto power on 
COP decisions. In sum, the formal multilateral decision-making structures of the 
UNFCCC COP and Kyoto Protocol meetings are largely consistent with cosmopolitan 
democratic principles despite acknowledged practical difficulties with small states 
having sufficient resources to fully participate in such meetings. 
 
Cosmopolitan democracy is generally supportive of improving the voice of non-state 
actors to assist in improving the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of states 
and intergovernmental organisations (Held 2006: 172). Consistent with this, the 
UNFCCC formally encourages civil society participation in lobbying and educational 
roles with the COP meeting process. The role of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), including environmental groups, is formally recognised in the UNFCCC with 
NGO’s able to attend COP meetings.13 For the purposes of COP meetings, non-
governmental organisations are divided into various categories including business non-
governmental organisations (BINGOs), research non-governmental organisations 
(RINGOs) and environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs). As Fisher 
(2010: 11) explains, the UNFCCC COP meetings have traditionally provided NGOs 
with significantly greater access to and influence with state negotiators than in other 
international institutions. McGregor (2011: 1) also describes the practice of NGOs using 
their access at UNFCCC COP meetings to pursue ‘insider strategies’ to influence 
government delegates through lobbying. 
                                                 
13 For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature on 4 
June 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S 107, art 7(2)(l), states the COP shall: ‘Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the 
services and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent international organizations and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies’; art 7(6) also states ‘Any body or agency, whether 
national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the 
Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the 
Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties 
present object.’  
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Despite the difficulties that arose at the Copenhagen COP 15 meeting,14 the UN climate 
meeting process is at least formally designed for a reasonably high level of 
inclusiveness, openness and transparency for all involved states and interested NGO 
groups. At this formal level, the UN climate regime has generally promoted an 
intersubjective understanding regarding the process of the international climate change 
governance that is consistent with cosmopolitan democratic principles. This 
understanding might be described as a discourse of inclusive multilateralism. 
 
However, there is a growing body of academic literature and policy commentary on 
international climate governance that is significantly contesting the formal inclusive 
multilateralism discourse of the UN climate regime. This work argues that greater 
effectiveness in responding to climate change might be found in institutions involving a 
smaller number of key states, particularly the large emitting countries.15 For example, 
US author David Victor is a keen advocate of these select decision making forums on 
climate change: 
 
In the area of international cooperation the solutions lie in efforts to create a club of a small 
number of important countries and craft the elements of serious cooperation. The efforts 
probably can’t emerge within the UNFCCC process because it is too large and inclusive. Nor 
can it easily arise from other available forums such as the G8, because their membership is too 
skewed to include the dozen or so countries that must be part of an effective solution. The most 
interesting idea for a new institution is outgoing Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin’s concept 
for a forum of leaders from the twenty key countries. (Victor 2006: 101) 
 
This call for key decisions on international climate change governance to be reduced to 
a select forum of key states has been echoed by US foreign policy commentator Wright 
(2009: 167), Australian climate policy commentator Kellow (2006: 287–303) and 
Australian Opposition climate change spokesman Greg Hunt M.P (2009). Prominent 
UK sociologist Anthony Giddens has similarly advocated for smaller forums of key 
nations: 
 
The large bulk of greenhouse gas emissions is produced by only a limited number of countries - 
as far as mitigation is concerned, what the majority of states do pales in significance compared to 
the activities of the large polluters. Only a limited number of states have the capability seriously 
                                                 
14 As Fisher (2010: 11) describes it, following COP 15 at Copenhagen there were criticisms particularly 
from ENGO groups claiming they were disenfranchised during the meeting. This is discussed further in 
this article. 
15 It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the claims to greater effectiveness in reducing emissions 
made by supporters of minilateralism. For the purposes of the following discussion, it shall be assumed 
that there is significant merit in the minilateralist claims in this regard. Certainly the minilateral argument 
that decision making amongst a small group of key states is easier to affect than consensus decision 
making across nearly 200 states carries some persuasive weight.  
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to pioneer technological innovation relevant to climate change … To be able to exploit this 
situation, we need quite a different perspective from those that emerged from Kyoto and Bali. 
An approach based on agreements or partnerships between individual nations, groups of 
countries and regions makes more sense- and could eventually strengthen more universal 
measures....A body representing the major polluters should be established post-haste. If we 
include the EU as a single entity, then 70 percent of cumulative world emissions of greenhouse 
gases have been produced by just six countries. They should be meeting regularly with one 
another. (2009: 220–221). 
 
This view is supported by leading Oxford climate change policy commentators, Steven 
Rayner and Gwyn Pryns: 
 
Relying on an international agreement that requires the consent of all national governments 
inevitably results in the very lowest of common denominators. Since fewer than twenty countries 
account for 80% of the world’s emissions and therefore have the potential to make any serious 
contribution to their mitigation, it would be better for diplomacy to focus upon them. In these 
early stages, the other 150 countries only get in the way. (2007: 27) 
 
US foreign policy commentator Moisés Naím has coined the expression 
‘minilateralism’ to explain this approach of seeking a ‘magic number’ of key states with 
influence upon an issue to craft smaller more responsive international institutions (2009: 
135–136). Naím argues that for climate change the ‘magic number’ of states to meet to 
thrash out a global deal is about twenty (2009: 135–136). The minilateral model for 
international climate governance proposed by Victor, Wright, Kellow, Rayner and 
Pryns, Naím, Giddens and Hunt essentially excludes the 175 or so states with the least 
greenhouse gas emissions and all NGO involvement. This discourse on international 
climate change policy might therefore be described as exclusive minilateralism. 
 
The exclusive minilateralism discourse has been significantly criticised by Eckersley 
(2010) on three grounds. First, many of the key disagreements in the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol negotiating process are due to a stand off between countries that are 
amongst the top emitters.16 An exclusive minilateral approach to climate governance 
may therefore still carry the same key negotiating obstacles of the larger forums. Second, 
those states most exposed to the risk of climate impacts, such as the low lying island 
states, would most likely be excluded from participation and advocacy in the proposed 
minilateral forums. This breaches ethical principles of due process and will likely result 
in climate agreements that are self-serving to the large emitting states and sacrifice the 
interests of smaller, more vulnerable states (Eckersley 2010). Third, due to exclusion of 
those most affected a climate agreement struck in an exclusive minilateral forum would 
                                                 
16 For one influential eye-witness account of the stand off between China and the USA over emission 
reduction obligations see Lynas (2009). 
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likely lack legitimacy within international society (Eckersley 2010).  
 
The following section provides a brief outline and history of the United Nations climate 
regime and three leading small group, non-UN forums for international climate change 
governance and that were formed over the past five years. 
 
The United Nations climate regime and its others 
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
The UNFCCC was formed in 1992 as a global agreement to provide broad principles to 
guide the human response to climate change. The UNFCCC was formed in response to 
the scientific advice provided by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC).17 The UNFCCC established an agreed global goal of stabilising greenhouse gas 
emissions at a level that will prevent dangerous climate change (art 2), a general 
obligation on all countries to collect data on and report their greenhouse gas emissions 
(art 4(1)(a)) and the important burden-sharing principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ (CBDR) to guide the future level of obligations from developed and 
developing countries (art 3(1)). Initially the developed states, listed in Annex 1 of the 
UNFCCC, set an aspirational, non-binding target to reduce their national greenhouse 
gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (art 4(2)(a)). However, it was soon 
recognised that stronger action was required from the Annex 1 developed states than 
merely aspirational emission reduction targets.  
 
In 1995 the Berlin Mandate (UNFCCC 1995: 4-6) of the UNFCCC, initiated a two-year 
period of global negotiations with a view to setting binding emission reduction targets 
for the UNFCCC Annex 1 countries. Negotiations for these binding emission reductions 
targets were completed at the UNFCCC Third Conference of the Parties (COP3) 
meeting in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change contains obligation for developed countries (listed in Annex B) to lead 
on reducing greenhouse gas emissions by taking binding targets to reduce or limit their 
greenhouse gas emissions, against a 1990 baseline, by the target period of 2008–2012. 
The developing countries were exempted from this initial period of emission reduction 
targets due to the burden sharing principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
agreed to in the UNFCCC. The CBDR principle required that developed countries 
                                                 
17 See Houghton, Jenkins & Ephraums (1990). 
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initially lead the way in emission reduction activities. The US Clinton Administration 
argued strongly at the Kyoto UNFCCC COP 3 meeting for including market-based 
flexibility mechanisms in the treaty, namely, emissions trading, joint implementation 
and a clean development mechanism, to assist the developed countries in meeting their 
emission targets at a least financial cost (Depledge 1995: 16–19).  
 
However, in early in 1997, the US Senate indicated that it would oppose US ratification 
of any climate change treaty that placed binding emission reductions on developed 
countries only, or which would harm the US economy. This presented a potentially fatal 
obstacle to US participation in the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the position of the US 
Senate, the Clinton Administration signed Kyoto in 1998 and continued attending 
meetings to negotiate the finer details of its implementation, including rules for the 
flexibility mechanisms. Doubts over US participation in the Kyoto Protocol further 
escalated towards the end of the Clinton Administration. In late 2000, at the UNFCCC 
COP 6 meeting at The Hague, the Clinton Administration abandoned negotiations on 
rules for implementing the flexibility mechanisms of Kyoto. In early 2002, the incoming 
G.W. Bush Administration formally announced the USA would not ratify Kyoto and 
would withdraw from all further discussions under the Protocol. Australia made a 
similar announcement shortly thereafter. The USA and Australia, two Annex 1 
countries that had agreed to emission limitation targets at Kyoto, thus indicated they 
would not ratify the treaty and were openly opposed to developing nations being 
granted a period of grace without binding emission reduction obligations. Despite the 
US and Australian stand against Kyoto, international negotiations on the rules to 
implement the treaty continued during 2001 with agreement on fine details to 
implement Kyoto finally reached at the UNFCCC COP 7 meeting in Marrakech in late 
2001 (UNFCCC 2002). The Russian Federation ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 
November 2004 (UNFCCC 2009a), thereby bringing the treaty into force. The 
developed countries in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol were then bound to meet their 
emission targets for the first commitment period of 2008–2012.  
 
The UNFCCC COP 13 meeting in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2007, agreed on a two-
year period of negotiations to agree on the shape of the international climate change 
regime after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires in late 2012 
(UNFCCC 2007). This negotiation was carried out under ‘two tracks,’ track one 
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involving the Kyoto Protocol states that looked to strengthen the Annex B emission 
reduction commitments of developed countries (Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol), the second (Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention) that included 
all states party to the UNFCCC, including the USA. The Copenhagen COP15 meeting 
in late 2009 was supposed to be a point of agreement on a new global architecture for 
the post–2012 period. However, after a near collapse of negotiations (Meilstrup 2010: 
131), the COP15 meeting only produced the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009b), an 
agreement of two pages in length negotiated by a sub-group of approximately six 
countries, agreed to by approximately twenty countries at the meeting and ultimately 
only ‘noted’ by the wider COP meeting, rather than formally endorsed as a COP 
decision. However, all major elements of the Copenhagen Accord have now been 
formally adopted by the UNFCCC COP process through the agreement reached at the 
COP16 meeting in Cancun, Mexico in December 2010 (Oberthür 2010: 6). 
 
The Asia Pacific Partnership 2005 
The launch of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) in 
mid–2005 came us a surprise to the international community and media.18 The APP 
states had provided no prior indication that they were negotiating an international 
climate change agreement. The partnership was officially announced at a press 
conference at the 2005 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial 
meeting in Vientiane, Laos (Downer 2005). Government Ministers from the six original 
APP countries (China, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea and the USA) were at the 
launch (Downer 2005). The Ministers explained the partnership was an ‘innovative and 
a fresh new development for the environment, for energy, security and for economic 
development in the region’ (Downer 2005). An APP ‘Vision Statement’ was released at 
the launch however it contained little information on how the partnership would 
operate.19 The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Downer, was the first to indicate the 
official APP position that the partnership was intended to complement the Kyoto 
Protocol rather than provide an alternative (Downer 2005).  
 
 
                                                 
18 For example, see Brown and Wilson (2005). 
19 See, Asia Pacific Partnership (2009a, 2009b). 
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The first Ministerial meeting of the APP was held in Sydney, Australia, in January 2006. 
A ‘Charter’ document was released at the Sydney meeting that describes the 
organisational structure of the partnership.20 The APP Charter establishes a governing 
body known as the ‘Policy and Implementation Committee’ (PIC) comprised of 
representatives from the seven partner governments (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2009b). 
The Charter also establishes eight sectoral (that is, industry based) Task Forces 
comprised of representatives from the partner governments, public research bodies and 
the private sector. It is the role of the APP Task Forces to formulate project plans for 
approval and funding allocation by the PIC (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2009b). At the 
2006 Sydney Ministerial meeting the PIC approved over 100 projects for the eight Task 
Forces (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2009b). By 2009, the total number of Task Force 
projects approved by the PIC was over 170 (Asia-Pacific Partnership 2010). The APP 
Task Forces meet several times each year although the exact number and timing of these 
meetings is not known. As at 2008, the APP had received only a total of US$200 
million in public funding pledged by the seven partner governments (US State 
Department 2008). The APP expected the private sector to provide a significant amount 
of the funding for the implementation of APP Task Force projects (US State 
Department 2008). 
 
A number of countries expressed interest in joining the APP. In October 2006, New 
Zealand released cabinet minutes indicating a desire to participate in the APP, initially 
by seeking involvement in APP Task Force activities (New Zealand Government 2006). 
The Russian Federation and Mexico also expressed interest in joining the APP (van 
Asselt 2007: 17–28). In late-2007, Canada was admitted as the seventh partnership 
country. To date, Canada is the only country that has been granted membership to 
expand the APP. The APP thus comprises a select grouping of seven countries. PIC 
meetings of the APP have only involved elite state actors. ENGO’s have been excluded 
from APP meetings although business and research organisations are key participants in 
the APP sectoral task forces (Black 2006; McGee & Taplin 2008: 209). 
 
APEC Sydney Leaders Declaration 2007 
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings were initiated by Australia in 
the late–1980s as an informal forum for dialogue amongst countries of the Asia Pacific 
                                                 
20 See Asia-Pacific Partnership (2009b). 
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region on trade liberalization issues. APEC has twenty-one member economies, 
including all APP nations except India. An APEC member state acts as coordinator and 
host an annual round of meetings for national leaders and senior business and 
government officials. APEC does not have a founding charter or formal constitution but 
instead relies upon an agreed set of procedures for hosting of its meetings. In September 
2007, Australia hosted the annual APEC Ministerial Meeting and Leaders Meeting in 
Sydney. At the meeting, Australia attempted to negotiate an APEC position on a long-
term, aspirational (that is, non-binding) global emissions reduction goal (Wilkinson 
2007). The meeting produced the ‘Sydney APEC Leaders Declaration on Climate 
Change, Energy Security and Clean Development’ (Sydney APEC Declaration). Given 
China’s reluctance to discuss global emissions goals, the Sydney APEC Declaration 
contains only a commitment by APEC countries to ‘work to achieve a common 
understanding on a long-term aspirational global emission reduction goal to pave the 
way for an effective post–2012 international arrangement’ (APEC 2007). The Sydney 
APEC Declaration adopts an approach similar to the APP of shifting the focus of 
international cooperation on climate change toward voluntary commitments for 
research, information sharing and development of cleaner technologies. The Sydney 
Declaration also parallels the APP by focussing climate change policy on non-binding 
targets for reduction in carbon intensity. The Declaration contains an aspirational target 
for a 25 percent reduction in energy intensity in the APEC economies by 2030, using 
2005 as a base year (APEC 2007). This energy intensity target is ‘APEC-wide’ so does 
not apply individually to any one country. The APEC Sydney Declaration again 
represented a shift towards international climate change policy being determined by a 
sub-group of states, with ENGOs excluded from the APEC forums (Feinberg 2008). 
 
US Major Economies Process 2007–2008 
In early 2007, President G. W. Bush announced a new US initiative climate change 
initiative that was initially called the ‘Major Emitters and Energy Consumers’ process 
(MEP) (White House 2007a). The US MEP proposed a series of US-sponsored 
meetings of fifteen of the world’s ‘top greenhouse economies and polluters’ to ‘develop 
a long-term global goal to reduce greenhouse gasses’ with each country working to 
‘achieve this emissions goal by establishing ambitious mid-term national targets and 
programs, based on national circumstances’ (White House 2007a). The initiative 
envisioned that national targets and programs would be determined by each state 
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individually (White House 2007a). The initiative also proposed that major emitting 
nations ‘develop parallel national commitments to promote key clean energy 
technologies,’ with the US facilitating international development banks to provide low-
cost financing options for clean energy technology transfer (White House 2007a). The 
MEP was specifically intended to ‘build on and advance US relations with the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and other technology and 
bilateral partnerships’ (White House 2007a). The MEP process would adopt the APP 
approach of drawing together representatives from various sectors such as power 
generation and energy production to devise a ‘common work program on best practices’ 
(White House 2007b). Despite launching the MEP, the Bush Administration claimed to 
be committed to the UNFCCC process and that the MEP meetings would ‘complement’ 
ongoing UN activity. 
 
The final MEP meeting was held at the conclusion of the G8 summit in Hokkaido, 
Japan, in July 2008. This meeting produced the first publicly released document of the 
MEP, the ‘Declaration of Leaders Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change’ 
(MEP Leaders Declaration) (White House 2008). The MEP Leaders Declaration 
contains a ‘shared vision’ for a long-term cooperative global goal for emission reduction, 
but does not contain any attempt to quantify such reduction (White House 2008). The 
MEP Leaders Declaration notes that developed states will implement economy wide 
mid-term goals and actions to achieve absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
(White House 2008). However, this statement on developed state mid-term goals is 
heavily qualified in that ‘where applicable’ developed states may simply focus on 
‘stopping the growth’ of emissions (White House 2008). This wording accommodated 
the Bush Administration’s approach of the USA concentrating on ‘stopping the growth’ 
of national emissions at least until 2025, rather than engaging in any absolute cut in 
emission levels. The MEP Leaders Declaration also strongly emphasised the APP 
approach of sectoral-based technology cooperation and information exchange (White 
House 2008). The MEP Leaders Declaration quite clearly draws inspiration from the 
APP task force approach to technology development. In March 2009, the US Major 
Economies Process was re-badged by the Obama Administration as the ‘Major 
Economies Forum on Energy and Climate’ (US State Department 2010). The seventeen 
countries of this new Obama-backed forum met on five occasions in the lead up to the 
Copenhagen COP 15 meeting with a view to reaching agreement on key climate related 
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issues (US State Department 2009). Both the Bush Major Economies Process and 
Obama Major Economies Forum meetings were state-to-state forums that excluded 
access for ENGOs, RINGOs and BINGOs (Greenpeace 2008).21 
 
Exclusive minilateralism: A strengthening discourse in international climate 
change governance? 
The exclusive minilateralism discourse has been steadily building strength in academic 
and policy commentating circles particularly amongst authors opposed to the binding 
targets and timetables approach of the Kyoto Protocol (Kellow 2010).  However, the 
strength of the exclusive minilateralism discourse is even more evident in the 
intersubjective understanding underlying the APP, APEC Sydney Declaration and US 
Major Economies Process. These non-UN climate change forums have sought to 
facilitate dialogue outside the UNFCCC process with a view to reaching important 
understandings on the level of ambition for medium and long-term emission reduction 
at a regional and/or global level. For example, the APP encourages each participating 
state to set its own non-binding greenhouse target to reduce greenhouse gas intensity, 
the level of ambition to be based on its own national circumstances (Asia-Pacific 
Partnership 2009b). The APEC Sydney Declaration contains a non-binding, APEC-wide, 
energy intensity reduction target of very modest substance (APEC 2007). The Obama 
US Major Economies Forum meetings failed to agree on a figure for a medium term 
collective emission reduction target. However, the Bush US MEP endorsed a medium-
term approach of all countries (including developed countries) setting and implementing 
their own economy wide mid-term goals and actions on emission reduction that may be 
based on ‘stopping the growth’ of their emissions (reduction of greenhouse gas intensity 
only) rather than reducing emissions in absolute terms (below a 1990 or similar 
baseline) (White House 2008). Important understandings were built in these select non-
UN forums as to the level ambition of future medium and long-term emission reduction 
targets (McGee and Taplin 2009). Discussions have occurred and understandings have 
been built in these select, non-UN minilateral forums that have excluded over 170 
countries, many of which will be impacted hardest by the early climate change impacts. 
As discussed above, environmental NGOs in particular have also been largely excluded 
from attending and lobbying at these non-UN, minilateral forums.  
                                                 
21 For a more detailed comparison of the APP, APEC Sydney Declaration and the US Major Economies 
Process, see McGee and Taplin (2009). 
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Further, the understandings built in these minilateral forums appear to have influenced 
the process of the Copenhagen COP 15 meeting. The COP15 meeting was dogged by 
criticism from smaller developing countries that key negotiating texts were developed in 
an opaque manner by a small group of developed countries22 rather than in the open, 
transparent and participatory process of earlier UNFCCC meetings. Meilstrup (2010) 
provides a detailed history of the diplomatic negotiations that lead to the outcome at 
COP 15. He explains that in 2009 Denmark sought to take advantage of its’ Presidency 
of the COP 15 meeting to reconceptualise that role from one of simply facilitating 
dialogue between meeting participants to one of agenda setting and leadership 
(2010:116–117). Denmark broke from usual UNFCCC process by entering into 
discussions outside the UNFCCC preparatory meetings for COP 15 to broker a ‘Danish 
Proposal’ for the COP 15 meeting (Meilstrup 2010: 124). During 2009, Denmark 
organised bilateral meetings with the EU, USA, Australia, Canada, the Maldives, Africa, 
Mexico, Brazil, China and India (Meilstrup 2010: 125) to advocate for the Danish 
proposal.  Denmark also arranged a multilateral meeting between 20-30 countries in 
early December 2009 to discuss the Danish Proposal (Meilstrup 2010: 127). This again 
occurred outside the formal UNFCCC preparatory meetings for COP15 that involved all 
state parties to the Convention. 
 
However, the ‘Danish Proposal’ was leaked to the United Kingdom newspaper The 
Guardian on the second day of the COP 15 meeting (Vidal 2009) thereby alienating the 
vast bulk of states that were unaware of its existence (Phelan 2010: 15, Rajamani 2010: 
826).  The G-77 plus China then denounced the Danish text as “undemocratic, unfair 
and draft with a lack of transparency” (Meilstrup 2010: 128).  As the negotiations at 
COP 15 moved towards their final days there was still no agreement on the extensive 
text being negotiated in the formal UNFCCC meeting process (Meilstrup 2010:128). A 
group of 26 state leaders worked over the Thursday night/Friday morning before the 
closure of the COP to generate a text however failed to reach agreement (Meilstrup 
2010: 128; Dimitrov 2010).  Finally, on the Friday before closure of the COP the 
leaders of five states—China, India, South Africa and Brazil and the USA—met in 
private and agreed on the modest three page document that became the Copenhagen 
Accord (Meilstrup 2010: 128; Grubb 2010). The text of this document was then hastily 
presented to the group of twenty six other countries that had been seeking to draft an 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Vidal (2009). 
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agreement (Meilstrup 2010: 128). In the dying hours of COP 15 the Copenhagen 
Accord (UNFCCC 2009b) was presented to the meeting for adoption. In a heated and at 
times acrimonious debate the Copenhagen Accord was rejected by Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Venezuela, Sudan and Tuvalu (Rajamani 2010: 826). Due to lack of consensus on the 
text of the Copenhagen Accord the COP only ‘noted’ rather than ‘adopted’ the 
document as a decision (Rajamani 2010: 826). 
 
Importantly, this history shows the influence of minilateralism on the events at 
Copenhagen. The failed Danish Proposal arose from a minilateral forum of confidential 
discussions between only 20-30 states. The Copenhagen Accord was also essentially 
produced in the minilateral setting of a confidential meeting between the USA and four 
large developing countries. The Copenhagen Accord was then presented to a slightly 
larger group of 26 countries that had been earlier negotiating a text before finally being 
unsuccessfully presented to the full COP meeting (a further 160 states) for approval. 
The Copenhagen COP 15 meeting therefore shows strong evidence of a willingness of 
key states to marginalise the open development of text through the UNFCCC meetings 
and instead have recourse to minilateral climate discussion forums as pioneered in the 
APP, APEC Sydney Declaration and US Major Economies Process. 
 
As discussed above, ENGO delegations at COP15 were also highly critical of the 
unusual opaqueness of negotiations and generation of negotiating texts at the meeting 
(Fisher 2010; McGregor 2011; Phelan 2010; Rajamani 2010: 3). The difficulty of NGO 
involvement at COP15 has been linked to the large number of NGO delegates, poor 
planning at the conference venue by the host Danish Government and a broadening of 
the agenda of climate justice groups present at the meeting (Fisher 2010). However, 
McGregor (2011: 4) argues that COP 15 demonstrated a more general disenfranchise-
ment of smaller countries and ENGOs within the COP process. The logistical problems 
at COP 15 no doubt played some part in NGO marginalisation at Copenhagen. However, 
it is important that this should not mask a more general disenfranchisement of ENGOs 
in international climate governance that had been building in the years leading to 
COP15 through the exclusive minilateralist institutions of the APP and US Major 
Economies Process.  
 
In summary, from 2005 onwards a number of significant non-UN forums for climate 
change dialogue show clear affinity with the exclusive minilateralism discourse. The 
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approach of the Denmark as COP President in the lead up to the COP 15 meeting and 
actions of key states at that meeting also show a propensity of exclusive small group 
negotiations and/or marginalisation of the of role ENGOs. When combined with 
significant academic advocacy for small group negotiations in international climate 
governance these developments indicate a growing strength of the exclusive 
minilateralist discourse.  
 
What challenges does the Exclusive Minilateralism Discourse provide for the 
furtherance of democracy in international climate change governance?  
The exclusive minilateralism discourse is in direct contestation with cosmopolitan 
democratic version of liberal multilateralism.  First, the very significant reduction in 
franchise advocated by the exclusive minilateral discourse (from all countries concerned 
with climate change to only the key emitters and/or economically power states) is 
obviously at odds with the expansion of democratic representation23 in international 
institutions that lies at the heart of cosmopolitan democratic project (Held 2006: 170–
172). The exclusive minilateralism discourse is therefore vulnerable to attack on the 
basis of its lack of legitimacy and failure to adhere to cosmopolitan democratic ideal of 
‘all inclusiveness’ (Held 2006: 171).  Second, the exclusive minilateralism discourse 
openly excludes civil society, particularly ENGOs, from participation in meetings of the 
‘inner sanctum’ of decision-making on international climate change policy. This 
conflicts with cosmopolitan democratic theory that promotes the voice of non-state 
actors as means of representing the aggregated interests of individuals and as an agent to 
monitor the accountability of states (Held 2006: 171). Third, the exclusive 
minilateralism discourse is also difficult to reconcile with cosmopolitan democratic 
ideal of enhancing the transparency and accountability of intergovernmental 
organisations (Held 2006: 172). In sum, the cosmopolitan democrat should be 
significantly concerned at the strengthening of the exclusive minilateralism discourse.  
 
The exclusive minilateralism discourse also has potential negative effects upon the level 
of discursive democracy in international climate governance. Dryzek indicates that in 
assessing a deliberative system it is important to consider the connections between the 
                                                 
23 Held (2006: 171) explains this expansion of democratic representation in international decision making 
forums on the basis of a principle of ‘all-inclusiveness,’ that is ‘those whose life expectancy and life 
chances are significantly affected by social forces and processes ought to have a stake in the 
determination of the conditions and regulation of these forces and processes, either directly or indirectly 
through political representatives.’ 
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‘public spaces’ of social movements, media outlets, internet, public hearings and other 
popular sites of communication and the ‘empowered spaces’ of formal collective 
decision making bodies such as the UNFCCC COP meetings (Dryzek 2010: 10). He 
suggests that effective deliberative systems have mechanisms by which public spaces 
can adequately transmit information and influence to the empowered space and thereby 
hold the decision makers in the empowered space to account (Dryzek 2010: 10). The 
Copenhagen COP 15 meeting demonstrated a flowering of the public spaces of 
international climate governance with intense media coverage of the meeting and a 
record number of NGO representatives registered to attend (Fisher 2010: 13). There 
were several large protest marches by ENGOs and climate justice movements during the 
two weeks of COP 15 demanding a fair, binding and ambitious treaty from the state 
representatives in the empowered space of the meeting halls and back rooms of the 
Bella Centre (McGregor 2011: 2; Fisher 2010: 14–15). However, despite the vibrancy 
of the public space surrounding the COP15 meeting, within the empowered space of the 
Bella Centre, there was a strong feeling from ENGOs of marginalisation and reduced 
ability to participate and effectively lobby state representatives (McGregor 2011: 3–4, 
Fisher 2010: 1). The minilateral approach of reducing negotiations to small groups of 
key states appears to have a significant negative impact upon the flows of influence and 
accountability between the public space and the empowered space of the formal 
negotiations. Discursive democracy is thus weakened if a flourishing public space is 
unable to transmit its discursive influence into the empowered space of international 
climate governance and hold actors in that space accountable for their decisions. 
 
Further, a continued strengthening of the exclusive minilateralism discourse and 
prevalence of exclusive minilateral institutions in international climate change 
governance carries significant risk that economically powerful states will seek a subtle 
redefinition of the ‘problem’ of human induced climate change and limit the range of 
acceptable policy options to those serving their immediate economic interests. The non-
UN minilateral climate forums discussed above have either explicitly or implicitly 
supported a rise in greenhouse emissions to 2050 that on the science of the IPCC will 
deliver in excess of a three degree average surface temperature increase above pre-
industrial levels (McGee & Taplin 2006: 183; McGee & Taplin 2009: 222–227). The 
country pledges made to the Copenhagen Accord and modelling done in support of the 
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APP both tacitly accept a rise in surface temperature of this magnitude.24 The key 
nations involved in these agreements have thus already affected a subtle shift in 
intersubjective understanding on what level of ambition might realistically be expected 
in global emission reduction and hence what global ambition should be on the level of 
acceptable climate change. If the level of ambition of greenhouse gas mitigation arising 
from minilateral forums remains low there is a significant risk that the subsequent world 
of three degree plus warming will not be one that is friendly to either cosmopolitan or 
discursive conceptions of democracy in international climate governance.25 
 
Arguments against that the consensus decision making rule of the UNFCCC COP 
process will likely continue to gather strength. As the necessity to act more ambitiously 
to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions dawns it may well become more difficult to obtain 
the consent of every state at COP meetings. It is therefore important that the COP 
reforms its decision making rule to allow for some form of majority decision making 
that will avoid grid lock in decision making on key issues. Such a proposal is currently 
being discussed within the UNFCCC26 and offers a useful starting point for reforming 
the cosmopolitan design of the COP process. However, there is also the possibility of 
attempting to formally incorporate some elements of the minilateralism discourse within 
the UNFCCC COP process. Eckersley (2010: 2011) has recently argued that the 
difficulties of the consensus decision making rule in the UNFCCC might be eased by 
the formation of a minilateral ‘Climate Council’ within the COP comprising 15 states 
that represent 70 percent of world population. The Climate Council would be comprised 
of the states that are most responsible for climate change, most vulnerable to climate 
change and with the greatest capacity to respond by providing resources for mitigation 
and/or adaptation (Eckersley 2010: 2011). The Climate Council would comprise a 
mixture of developed and developing state voices27. The Climate Council would have a 
role of providing a forum for discussion of difficult to resolve issues on mitigation and 
adaptation and make persuasive recommendations back to the full COP meeting 
                                                 
24 See, for example Climate Action Tracker (2010) and Ford et al. (2006). 
25 For instance, Flannery (2005; 291–295) warns of the danger that a failure of current generations to stem 
greenhouse gas emissions through democratic may lead to more authoritarian responses when more 
severe climate change impacts start to appear. 
26 In May 2011 Mexico and Papua New Guinea formally proposed that substantive decisions of the COP 
might be based, in the absence of consensus, on a three quarter majority vote (UNFCCC 2011). 
27 Eckersley (2010) suggests that one configuration for membership on the Climate Council would be: the 
USA UE, Japan, Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France , Poland, China, India, Brazil, South Africa and 
three representatives from the Association of Small Island States, the African Group and the least 
developed countries. 
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(Eckersley 2010: 2011). In order to improve the discursive democratic design of the 
Climate Council it might also be possible to include representatives from peak NGOs 
such as Climate Action Network, World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
and the chairman of the IPCC. The inclusion of these voices from civil society might 
improve the transmission of influence and accountability between the public spaces of 
NGO activity and the empowered space of the UNFCCC COP meeting. 
 
Conclusion 
The exclusive minilateralism discourse in international climate change governance has 
strengthened significantly over the past five years through both academic and policy 
commentary and non-UN climate forums arising chiefly from the Asia-Pacific region. 
This experimentation with minilateral forums for climate change negotiations appears 
also to have also been present in the lead up to and during the Copenhagen COP15 
meeting. There is a significant prospect that the exclusive minilateralism discourse will 
continue to strengthen and further shape global climate change governance. The 
discourse represents a challenge to the pattern of inclusive multilateral climate 
governance that has been established in the UN climate regime over the past two 
decades. A possible response to the exclusive minilateralism discourse is to consider 
reforming the consensus decision making rule of the UNFCCC to make it easier for the 
COP to obtain binding agreement on difficult issues relating to mitigation and 
adaptation.  Drawing on Eckersley (2010: 2011), it might also be possible to formally 
include the exclusive minilateralism discourse within the UNFCCC COP process by the 
formation of a peak advisory body comprising representatives from the most 
responsible, vulnerable and capable states and peak environmental, business and 
scientific NGOs. This body might have a strong advisory role on issues that become 
bogged down in the wider COP process. Both strategies need to be considered carefully 
in deciding how the institution of the UNFCCC should respond to the exclusive 
minilateralism discourse. 
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